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[So F. No. 19740. In Bank. Nov. 14, 1958.] 
BROOKEE KUBON, Appellant, v. WALTER KUBON, 
Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Presumptions-Sufiicienc:y of Evidence.-Where an 
appeal is on the judgment roll, which does not contain the 
evidence before the trial court, it will be conclusively presumed 
that the evidence supports the findings, such as findings that 
a restraining order was duly served on plaintiff and that all 
allegations of the answer were true. 
[i] DepositiollS-Compliance With Statute.-In an action to re-
cover on a Nevada money judgment based on orders in a 
Nevada divorce decree requiring defendant to pay for child 
support, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's 
motion for a commission to examine witnesses in Nevada in 
the absence of evidence to show that plaintiff complied with 
Code Civ. Proe., 112024,2025 or 202!;lh, relating to the manner 
of taking depositions out of the atate. 
[8] Trial-Order of Procedure-Disposition of Issuea.-In an ac-
tion to recover on a Nevada money judgment based on orders 
in a Nevada divorce decree requiring defendant to pay for 
child support, the trial court did not err in not hearing 
defendant's plea in abatement prior to hearing the ease, since 
Code Civ. Proe., 1597, provides only that if the answer raises 
a plea in abatement the eourt "may," on motion of either party, 
proceed to the trial of such special defense before the trial of 
any other issue in the ease. 
[4] Abatement-Trial-A plea in abatement may be heard either 
before the trial of the other issues or along with the trial of 
the other issues, and if the latter procedure is followed the 
trial court may, after the trial, grant the plea in abatemenL 
[6] Id.-Waiver.-A defendant does not waive his plea in abate-
ment by not insisting that it be tried separately and prior to 
the issues on the merits. 
APPEAL from a judgm.ent of the Superior Court of Karin 
County. Thomas F. Keating, Judge. Affirmed. 
[3] See Oal.lur., Trial, 1§l7, 18; Am.lur., Trial, 154 et eeq. 
[4] See Oal.lm.ili, Abatement and Revival, 155. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, 111144, 1150; 
[2] Dcpositions, §4; [3] Trial, 120; [4] Abatement, 178; [5] 
Abatcment, 176. 
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Action to recover on a Nevada money judgment based on 
orders in a divorce judgment requiring defendant to pay for 
child support. Judgment for defendant affirmed. 
Robert W. Corlett for Appellant. 
Bruce B. Bales for Respondent. 
McCOMB, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment denying 
her recovery on a Nevada money judgment which was based 
on orders in a divorce decree requiring defendant to pay sup-
port for their two minor children. The appeal is on the judg-
ment roll and certain exhibits of a documentary nature that 
were requested in the notice of appeal as provided in rule 5a 
of the Rules on Appeal (36 Ca1.2d 5). 
The record discloses the following: 
i. March 27, 1952, the parties were divorced in the District 
Court of Clark County, Nevada, which court had personal 
jurisdiction of the parties. Pursuant to an agreement between 
them, their property rights were settled and legal custody 
of the two minor children was given to both, physical custody 
being awarded to plaintiff. Defendant was ordered to pay 
$100 per month for child support. The court reserved "juris-
diction to make such other and further Orders with respect 
. to the care, custody, support and maintenance of the said 
minor children as from time to time may seem meet and 
proper." . 
ii. August 27, 1953, on a motion to change the custody of 
the children, the Nevada court made an order allowing de-
lendant their physical custody during the summer vacation. 
iii. August 3, 1954, defendant filed a petition in the Su-
perior Court of the State of California, in and for the County 
of Marin, seeking appointment as guardian of the children. 
At the time this petition was filed the children were residing 
with him in his San Rafael residence under his lawful custody 
pursuant to a Nevada custody order. 
Upon the filing of this petition, the Superior Court of Marin 
County issued its temporary restraining order restraining 
plaintiff from taking the minor children from defendant's 
custody or from defendant's San Rafael home pending the 
hearing on the petition. This restraining order was duly 
served upon plaintiff on August 5, 1954. 
iv. In October 1954 the Nevada court again modified the 
order for custody, taking away from defendant the right to 
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t.he summer custody of the children and awarding their full 
custody to plaintiff, with the right of reasonable visitation in 
Nevada to defendant. 
v. Support payments for September 1954 to June 1955 
were not made by defendant. Pursuant to chapter 128 of the 
Statutes of Nevada, plaintiff thereafter made a motion to 
reduce the delinquent support payments to a formal judg-
ment. The court ordered service of the notice of motion on 
defendant by registered mail, return receipt requested. De-
fendant made no personal appearance, and judgment was en-
tered against him for $1,000, plus $250 attorney's fees and 
, $10 costs. 
; vi. September 18, 1955, plaintiff filed a complaint in Marin 
'County, California, to establish the Nevada judgment as a 
judgment of this state. 
; vii. October 17, 1955, defendant filed an answer in which he 
admitted submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the Nevada 
court in all proceedings except the last one and admitted the 
nonpayment of, and his ability to pay, the support during the 
10-month period involved in the judgment. 
Defendant set up, among others, the affirmative defense that 
it would be against public policy to enforce the judgment in 
California because plaintiff did not come into court with 
"clean hands." He alleged that she was in contempt of the 
very court whose aid she was seeking, in that she had violated 
the temporary custody and restraining order issued in the 
guardianship proceeding which was filed in Marin County in 
August 1954 and was still pending; that she had kidnaped the 
children from his San Rafael home on August 20, 1954, and 
taken them into Nevada, where they had been concealed in an 
abandoned mine in the desert; that as a direct result of her 
'wrongful conduct the Nevada court made the child support 
order and the judgment bas~d thereon which she was endeav-
oring to enforce in the instant action; and, further, that she 
had never appeared nor purged herself of contempt in such 
proceeding and should not be 'permitted to profit from her 
own wrongdoing. 
viii. October 21, 1955, plaintiff filed a motion to strike the 
foregoing affirmative defense, which motion was denied by 
the trial judge. 
ix. After trial, the judge found dlat t.he allegations set forth 
above in defendant's affirmative defense were true and denied 
plaintiff recovery on the Nevada judgment. 
) 
) 
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QU6Stiom: First. Did the Irial court err in denying plain-
liff'. motion to .trike defendant's affirmative defense .et forth 
above' 
No. It is contended that there was no personal service of 
the restraining order on plaintiff and no hearing thereon was 
held within 10 days, as a result of which the restraining order 
was void, and that the action of the trial court in denying 
plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's affirmative defense set 
forth above was therefore error. 
[1] However, Andings of fact made by the trial court 
refute these arguments. Since the present appeal is upon 
the judgment roll and does not contain the evidence before 
the trial court, it will be conclusively presumed that the evi-
dence sustained the Andings. (Hunt v. Plavsa, 103 Cal.App. 
2d 222, 224 [1] [229 P.2d 482] ; Estate of Larson, 92 Cal.App. 
2d 267, 268 [1] [206 P.2d 852]; ct. Reid v. Valley Res-
taurants, Inc., 48 Ca1.2d 606, 609 [2] [311 P.2d 473].) 
Accordingly, in the instant ease, the Anding of the trial 
court that "said restraining order was duly served upon" 
plaintiff on August 5, 1954, is presumed to. be supported by 
competent evidence. 
Likewise, there is nothing in the record to show that a hear-
ing was not held within 10 days after the issuance of the order, 
and the trial court's finding that aU the allegations of the 
answer were true (one of the allegations being that said order 
was "still pending in the Marin County Superior Court") is 
presumed to be supported by the evidence. 
[S]Second. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff'. 
motion for a commission to examine toifn6Sses in N 6vada' 
No. There is a total absence of any evidence in the record 
to show that plaintiff complied with sections 2024, 2025 or 
2025% of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, there is 
no affirmative showing of error upon the part of the trial 
court. 
[3] Third. Did tke trial court err in not hearing defend-
ant's affirmative defense, whick constituted a plea in abate-I 
ment, prior to trying the case' 
No. Section 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides 
only that if the answer raises a plea in abatement "the court 
may, upon the motion of either party, proceed to the trial of 
such special defense • . • before the trial of any other issue. 
in the ease .... " (Italics added.) 
[4] It is clear that a plea in abatement may be heard either 
before the trial of other issues or along with the trial of 
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ot.hp.r issues and th8t if the latt.er procedure is followed, 
the trial court may, aCter the trial, grant the plea in abate-
ment. 
[5] There is no rule of law to the dect that a defendant 
waives his plea in abatement by not insisting that it be tried 
separately and prior to the issues on the merits. 
The judgment is aftirmed. 
Shenk, J.~ Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Plaintiff brought this action to establish as a judgment 
in this state, a Nevada judgment for accrued arrearages for 
child support, attorney's fees and costs. The Nevada judg-
ment was based on the modification order of October, 1954, 
which continued in dect defendant's previously adjudicated 
obligation to pay plaintiff $100 per month for child support. 
It is undisputed that the Nevada court had personal juris-
diction over defendant to enter the October, 1954 order and 
that its jurisdiction was continuing. Accordingly, it had 
jurisdiction to enter the judgment for arrearages if adequate 
notice to defendant was given. (LBWis v. Lewis, 49 Cal.2d 
389,395-396 [317 P.2d 987], and authorities cited.) 
: The Nevada court provided that notice should be served on 
defendant "by registered mail, return receipt requested," 
and the conclusion of the trial court herein that the Nevada 
court did not acquire jurisdiction was based on its 1lnding that 
uno return receipt bearing defendant's eignature has ever 
been presented." The order fixing the kind of notice to be 
given, however, did not require a return receipt signed by' 
defendant personally and the return receipt in the record, 
eigned "Walter J. Kuhon by Charlotte G. Kuhon," supports 
the recital of the Nevada judgment that "evidence [of service 
had] • .'. been introduced" and the Nevada court's assump-
tion of jurisdiction. Service by. registered mail was reason-
ably calculated to give defendant notice of the proceedings 
(see Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229 [66 S.Ct. 556, 90 
L.Ed. 635]), and there is no finding that defendant had no 
actual notice of them. (See Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Cal.2d 389 
396 [317 P.2d 987].) 
Nor can the Nevada judgment be attacked on the ground 
that plaintiff may have been in contempt of the custody and 
support order on which it was based. Whether or not plain-
tiff's denial of defendant's visitation right was a defense to 
) 
) 
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her ~laim tor the support payments was for the Nevada court 
to det.erminr. when plaintiff sought judgment for the :arrear-
ages (sec Closset v. Clossct, 71 Nev. 80 [280 l'.2d 290, 291] ; 
'n re Elmer's Guardianship, 125 N;J.Eq. 148 [4 A.2d 387, 
388] ; Me·issller v. Meissner, 323 Ill.App. 299 [55 N.E.2d 312] ; 
.Anderson v . .Anderson, 207 Minn. 338 [291 N.W. 508, 509]; 
88 A.L.R. 199; 105 A..L.R. 901), and that question is now 
foreclosed by that judgment. 
The crucial question therefore is whether plaintiff's removal 
of the children from defendant's custody in violation of the 
temporary restraining order issued by the California court 
prior to the October, 1954 Nevada custody and support order 
is a defense to plaintiff's action on the valid Nevada judg-
ment for arrearages due pursuant to the latter order. It is 
my opinion that recognition of such defense violates the full 
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
a statc may not vindicate its own policy by refusing enforce-
ment of a sister state judgment for the payment of money 
on ·the ground that its recognition would violate the policy of 
the state where enforcement is sought. (Morris v. Jones, 329 
U.S. 545, 553 [67 8.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488, 168 A.L.R. 656] ; 
Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 291 [59 8.Ot. 557, 83 L.Ed. 
653] ; Rocke v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 451-452 [48 S.Ot. 142, 
72 L.Ed. 365, 53 A.L.R. 1141]; Fauntleroy v. lIum, 210 U.S. 
230,236 [28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039].) It has pointed out 
that in the case of valid final judgments for the payment of 
money, the exceptions to the full faith and credit clause ·are· 
rare or nonexistent (Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 553 [67· 
S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488, 168 A.L.R. 656] ; MagnoZia PetroZeum 
Co. v. Hunt, 820 U.S. 430, 438 [64 S.Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed. 149, 150 
A.L.R. 413]), and it has held that a "state which may not· 
constitutionally refuse to open its courts to a suit on a judg-
ment of another state because of the nature of the cause of 
action merged in the judgment I citation], obviously cannot, 
by the adoption of a particular rule of liability or of pro-
cedure, exclude from its courts a suit on the judgment." 
(Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 292 [59 8. Ct. 557, 83 L.Ed; 
653].) Accordingly, just as we cannot directly refuse full 
faitb and credit to the Nevada judgmE'ut becam~e the Nevada 
court failed to give effect to our policy of not a!;sisting a 
contemptuous litigant, we cannot invoke thnt policy as a rule 
of procedure to sustain a plea in abatement to a suit on that 
judgment. 
) 
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At the time the Nevada order of October, 1954 and the 
judgment based thereon were entered, plaintiff was already 
in contempt of the California court. That fact was for the 
Nevada court to consider in entering its order and subsequent 
judgment. Moreover, even had the California order such 
dignity as to compcl its recognition in Nevada under the fun 
faith and credit clause, a final judgment entered in disregard 
of it could not now be denied enforcement here. (Treinics 
v. Sunshine Min. Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 [60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 
85] ; Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Ca1.2d 389, 393 [317 P.2d 987].) 
If in the face of the Nevada judgment the California court 
could not vindicate respect for its own judicial processes that 
had been erroneously denied full faith and credit, a fortiori, 
. it cannot do so when those processes are not entitled to full 
faith and credit.- Any doubt is set at rest by Morris v. 
Jones, 329 U.S. 545 [67 S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488, 168 A.L.R. 
656]. In that case a Missouri judgment was obtained in 
direct violation of an Illinois injunction against prosecuting 
the action. The court held that the time to determine the 
effect of the Illinois injunction was in the Missouri action 
and that although it had been given no effect therein, the 
defendant was precluded by the full faith and credit clause 
from attacking the final Missouri judgment when plaintiff 
sought to establish' it in Illinois. 
Even if we were 110t constitutionally compelled to reject 
defendant's plea in abatement based on plaintiff's contempt 
of the temporary restraining order, we should reject it on its 
own merits. After the temporary restraining order was 
issued, the parties fully litigated the questions of custody and 
child support in Nevada. Nevada was the state primarily 
concerned with the children's welfare. Their custody had 
theretofore been awarded pursuant to a Nevada decree, they 
had lived in Nevada during the previous school year, and 
they had returned to Nevada and presumably reentered 
school there. It must be presum~d that the Nevada court 
concluded that tlH~ir best interests dictated that they should 
remain with their mother there and that defendant should 
continue to contribute to their support. The Nevada court 
·Since it was not a final judgment, the temporary restraining order 
was not entitled to full fllitll and credit under existing law (see discus-
sion in Worthley v. Worthley, 44 CIl1.2d 46", 468-469 f283 P.2d 191) 
Hen if it is assllmt'd thnt if final it would he entitleu to slIell II roteeti on. 
(See Equitable Life .A.sslir. Boc. v. Gex' Estate, 184 Mi~s. 577 [186 So. 
6;;!l, 664]; Frye v. Chicago, B. I. 4' P. By. Co., 157 Minn. 52 [195 N.W. 
62!l, 632J.) 
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did not err in placing the welfare of the clUldl'eD above the 
desirability of compelling plaintiff to respect the order of the 
California court. (See Lerner v. 8*penor Co*rt, 38 Cal. 
2d 676, 682 [242 P.2d 321], and uses cited.) Surely after 
this litigation and the Nevada court's determination that the 
children should stay where they were, it 1US not incumbent 
on plaintiff to set that order at "!taught, ~~e the children 
from school, and return them to California solely to vindicate 
the dignity of our court and pmge herself of contempt. 
None of the cases involving -the rule that relief should be 
denied to a contemptous litigant involved facts such as these. 
Moreover, many of them indicate that the true basis for the 
rnle is to compel obedience, not to work an automatic for-
feiture of whatever rights may be involved. Thus, in both 
Krog v. Krog, 32 Cal.2d 812 [198 P.2d 510], and Borenstein I 
v. Borenstei'1l, 11 Ca1.2d 301 [79 P.2d 388], it was held that 
a stay of proceedings until the appellant complied with the 
court's order, not a dismissal of his appeal, was the proper 
remedy for his contempt. (See also In re Bauman, 82 Cal. 
App.2d 359, 364 [186 P.2d 154].) When as in this case, 
plaintiff can purge herself of contempt only by uprooting the 
children in prejudice of their best interests as determined by 
the Nevada court after a full adversary hearing, belated com-
pliance cannot be justified. Nor is the forfeiture of her rights 
and those of the children fit punishment for her past wrong. 
(See Allen v. Allen, 138 Cal.App.2d 706, 708-709 [292 P.2d 
5811.) 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
.~." 
